Geopolitics Explained: Scenario Analysis and Predictions For 2026 - Africa
The Geopolitical Landscape In Africa In 2026
Contents
Introduction
The Democratic Republic of The Congo
Egypt
Ethiopia
Gabon
Libya
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique
Nigeria
Somalia and Somaliland
South Africa
Sudan and South Sudan
The Sahel States
Concluding Remarks
Introduction
As we make our way through the first few days of 2026, geopolitics has already escalated in multiple areas around the world. We’ve seen the United States’ operation in Venezuela, protests in Iran, and tensions in Yemen.
Despite these clear escalations, there exist many geopolitical issues around the world that are less obvious. As we head into 2026, we need to explore these issues also.
The most important thing I want to achieve with this discussion today is to break through the noise. The United States and Trump especially produce so much noise in the mainstream media, but we need to explore what underlying forces are going to contribute to the direction of our geopolitical world in 2026.
Today, we’ll start by focusing on Africa. Over the coming weeks, I’ll explore nations from the other continents around the world.
This is going to be a long discussion, but I hope the contents section at the header of this post can help aid navigation.
Let’s dive into where Africa could be heading in 2026.
The Democratic Republic of The Congo (DRC)
Conflict in the East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has involved many surrounding nations over the past few decades. The Congo Crisis started these tensions in 1960, and the region has seen little stability since.
Today, the conflict in the DRC largely involves Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The M23 rebels are the largest non-state actor, and they are reported to be largely backed by Rwanda. This is supported by the M23 leader, who reportedly previously fought in the Rwandan army. In recent years, the group made gains, capturing territory in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. In June 2025, a peace deal agreement was reached between the DRC and Rwanda, which didn’t include the M23 rebels, and as a result, the fighting periodically continued. In November 2025, the M23 rebels signed a framework agreement for peace with the DRC government in Qatar, but once again, periodic fighting has continued.
As a result, I expect the M23 rebels to continue their aggression in 2026. This allows Rwanda to seek to somewhat save face while still attempting to secure its western border shared with the DRC, and gain from the region’s advantages. The region of this conflict is known to be a resource-rich region.
As a part of the United States seeking to find different sources of rare earths and critical minerals, it brokered the peace deal in June 2025, seeking to gain access to these resources in a minerals deal signed with the DRC. This includes coltan, which is the ore from which tantalum is produced. Tantalum is used in mobile phones and other electronics, and 40% of the global supply originates in the DRC. Rwanda’s exports of critical minerals have risen sharply in recent years, and it is suspected that a large proportion of these exports are from this region of conflict.
I expect tensions to remain elevated here, largely because the United States doesn’t want peace; they are self-interested to want to advance their access to diversified rare earths and critical minerals. China is known to process a large amount of minerals coming out of the DRC, and the United States has accused the Chinese of being controlling and coercive, with $10m of Chinese investment directed to the mining industry in the DRC some years ago.
If the United States establishes a presence here, they undermine China slightly. But, with conflict remaining, I imagine alternative sources of rare earths and critical minerals will be easier for the United States to develop than those in the DRC.
As a result of the superpower tussle between the United States and China, taking clear priority for the United States through the diversification of critical minerals, I expect conflict here to remain. The United States only signed the initial peace deal for its own individual gain.
The other nations are seeking to protect their borders and interests in the region. Burundi and South Africa have sent troops to support the DRC, and Uganda doesn’t want Rwanda to gain too much influence in the region. These nations further complicate the pursuit of peace and ensure that pursuing an end to this fighting is no easy feat.
Egypt
Egypt finds itself involved in the Middle East as it borders Gaza, while also facing geopolitical tensions with its neighbours to the South in Africa.
In the Middle East, Egypt is one of the strongest political mediators. Egypt has held formal diplomatic relations with Israel for decades (1979, following the 1978 Camp David Accords), but this relationship has been somewhat tested over the last year through the discovery of tunnels from Egypt into Gaza. Still, despite this, Egypt remains incredibly important to addressing the conflict in the region, whether this current process leads to lasting peace or not.
However, refugee pressure from Sudan and Gaza, general border insecurity, and militarisation in the Sinai could affect Egypt in the coming year. On the topic of militarisation in the Sinai, Egypt reportedly has broken the limits set by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, and in September, Benjamin Netanyahu asked the United States to press Egypt on its buildup. This could stoke some tensions between the Egyptians and the Israelis.
In some ways, Egypt is cursed by its geography. The nation struggles to grow enough food for itself, and they suffer from water scarcity worries.
These worries have seen tensions spike with Ethiopia, which finished constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the past year.
This is the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa. The Nile provides Egypt with around 90% of its freshwater, and the river flows downstream from the dam to Egypt. As such a vital necessity for Egypt, this has created tension.
Despite concerns, studies have shown no major disruption to downstream flows during the reservoir being filled, which occurred between 2020 and 2024. But, even if this card that Ethiopia holds isn’t weaponised, it does give Ethiopia greater control over a necessity for Egypt. Due to this, tensions will likely remain.
With Ethiopia looking towards port access in the Red Sea and towards tensions between Somalia and Somaliland, I wouldn’t expect them to weaponise this against the Egyptians. Also, as I’ll discuss later, Ethiopia could find tensions much closer to home in 2026.
In a more positive light, the GERD could actually benefit other nations. Ethiopia’s electricity production from the dam is expected to provide power to 60% of its population that previously lacked access, and exports are expected to neighbouring countries such as Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti, and Tanzania.
Despite these disadvantages geographically, Egypt is also blessed by its geography, in large part due to their control over the Suez Canal. When the Houthis aren’t attacking everything that moves in the Red Sea, this gives Egypt huge maritime and trade power in the region. If it were up to Egypt, geopolitical stability in the region would restore transit volumes, boost inflows, and boost Egypt’s relevance in global trade and energy markets.
Unfortunately, in a world that is shifting from outright globalisation to regionalisation, Egypt will remain a key geographic player, but perhaps to a lesser extent on a global stage. With Red Sea disruptions, many nations have been forced to travel via the Cape of Good Hope, off the coast of South Africa. This is much longer, but trade routes could be set to undergo some redrawing in the coming years, even if routes are longer.
Finally, Egypt does face economic issues. They possess skyrocketing external debt servicing costs, currency devaluations, and IMF limitations. This could present itself in social pressure.
Egypt’s population is young, urbanising, and faces socio-economic strain. This economic strain, it brings continued pressure. Geopolitically, Egypt finds itself in a balancing act. They maintain relations with the West, as well as those nations that are seeking a more multipolar world. In periods of geopolitical tension, nations that balance and remain neutral emerge from these periods less damaged than other nations. Egypt hopes this can be the case for them, but it could face internal pressures in 2026 and beyond.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa. With a population of over 136 million people, the nation demands attention when analysing the region.
As discussed in the section on Egypt, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will retain geopolitical relevance even if escalation doesn’t occur, which I believe is unlikely.
The Ethiopians also share more of the same difficulties the Egyptians face, including bordering a fractured Sudan and instability in the Red Sea. But, in exploring the region surrounding Ethiopia, we first have to explore its domestic environment. It’s notable that not too long has passed since Ethiopia was embroiled in its own conflict.
The Tigray War took place between 2020 and 2022 in what was essentially an Ethiopian civil war. The region of Tigray rejected federal authority, and so the Federal Government of Ethiopia fought with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The Pretoria Agreement ended the conflict in 2022, with the process hoping to reintegrate Tigray into Ethiopia administratively.
A full political settlement is incomplete, and trust remains extremely low. To make matters worse, the TPLF fragmented into two factions. Some accept the Pretoria Agreement, and others view it as capitulation. These blocs within the TPLF continue to scrap today.
In March 2025, this more aggressive breakaway faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael, took control of the Tigrayan towns of Adigrat and Adi-Gudem. The faction is also accused of collaborating with Eritrea for intelligence gathering, although Eritrea denies this.
The other faction, led by Getachew Reda, the interim leader of Tigray, is supported by Ethiopia, and fled to Addis Ababa after this coup.
This entire peace process and fragmentation are relevant for Eritrea, which also fought the TPLF. However, Eritrea was not invited to the Pretoria Agreement and hence wasn’t a signatory. This reportedly greatly hurt the Eritreans, who remain angered at Ethiopia today.
This is one potential flashpoint that will take some attention for both Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2026. It could spark internally within Ethiopia over Tigray, or it could also pit the two nations against each other.
In 2025, Eritrea called for young people to sign up for the army. Ethiopia also reportedly deployed troops to their shared border. Despite Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ruling out a conflict with Eritrea to gain access to the Red Sea, Eritrea has stuck to a harsh tone in response whenever Ethiopia’s Red Sea access hopes are discussed.
This is relevant because Ethiopia is a landlocked nation. As a result, they need port access in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden from other nations. Over 90% of Ethiopia’s trade passes through Djibouti Port. In recent years, the Port of Berbera in Somaliland have given Ethiopia transit access and a minority stake. This is politically sensitive due to the Somalia-Somaliland dispute, which did see sparks of conflict in 2025. I discuss this in more detail below.
Despite Ethiopia not formally recognising Somaliland, they treat it as a distinct political entity, and did vow to one day recognise the territory as a part of a 2024 Memorandum of Understanding.
Of other ports, Port Sudan is effectively non-viable due to the Sudanese Civil War, and Eritrean ports remain politically sensitive due to the Eritrea-Ethiopia War. Despite the 2018 peace agreement and temporary positive relations, no sustained commercial access has resumed for Ethiopia. With tensions rising in 2025, this likely won’t improve in 2026.
This shows how deeply Ethiopia relies on Djibouti, especially, but also on Somaliland.
Unfortunately for Ethiopia, its reliance on Somaliland could spark further tensions in the Horn of Africa with Somalia.
Eritrea, in response to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, signed a security agreement with Somalia and Egypt, creating further sparks that could ignite in the region.
Ethiopia hopes to maintain as stable an environment as possible in the Horn of Africa. If stability is maintained, as a clear geopolitical power in the Horn of Africa in comparison to the nations around it, Ethiopia could benefit from investment and infrastructure buildout. Still, many flashpoints remain that could very easily spark in 2026.
In 2026, Ethiopia will also go to the polls. Could this be led by younger generations, as the youth wish to address economic inequality? Yet another spark that could be lit domestically in Ethiopia.
Gabon
Gabon experienced a military coup in 2023 that overthrew President Ali Bongo Ondimba. General Brice Oligui Nguema was installed as the transition president, but in 2025, he was elected as President under a new constitution.
Earlier today, the Finance Minister Henri-Claude Oyima was replaced as Gabon faces a tightening liquidity situation. This highlights an issue for Gabon with its reliance on its oil revenues. As oil prices fall, this negatively impacts Gabon since hydrocarbons account for around 40% of the nation’s GDP.
Gas, manganese, and timber sector development is underway, but Gabon hopes these industries soon come online.
Gabon has over 80% forest cover, which could provide a promising developing timber industry, which will allow Gabon to diversify its revenues. However, this doesn’t emerge overnight.
Without economic diversification, Gabon could need economic support, likely from the IMF. Gabon has been under IMF surveillance due to its declining oil revenues and an economic shock as a result of COVID-19.
Since this diversification won’t arise immediately, Gabon’s balance of payments and liquidity problems will persist throughout 2026.
Libya
Libya remains politically fragmented today. After the U.S. intervention toppled Gaddafi in 2011, a humanitarian crisis and a political crisis arose. This led to two separate governments based in Tripoli and Tobruk, respectively. These two sides signed a permanent ceasefire in 2020. The aim from here was to form a unity government. In March 2022, the House of Representatives in Libya ceased to recognise the Government of National Unity, instead proclaiming an alternative government known as the Government of National Stability should be the recognised form of leadership.
Since then, both governments have been functioning separately, which has led to dual power in Libya. Nations around the world continue to recognise the Government of National Unity as the legitimate government.
Humanitarian conditions are improving in Libya, but serious challenges remain.
The nation is economically stressed, but has large oil reserves. However, they could face the same problem as Gabon, with downward pressure on oil prices and high reliance on hydrocarbon revenues. Libya could also be engaging with the IMF in 2026, but any program is limited by Libya’s political fragmentation, and hence won’t be a full IMF funding program. This disadvantages Libya.
Without a single political entity in charge, this is naturally going to slow any positive developments that could exist in Libya.
Elections have been postponed for years due to disputes over legal and constitutional frameworks. Despite a process being launched in December 2025 to establish proposals for the electoral process, I wouldn’t expect this to happen quickly. Any election would be contingent on an agreement on laws, procedures, and security arrangements, and these issues have been ingrained for years.
Also, with many nations having stakes in Libya, proxy influence can worsen this domestic fragmentation.
In 2026, the political status of Libya remains up in the air. Despite international recognition for a unity government, I expect more of the same slow fragmentation.
Mauritius
Mauritius is entering 2026 as politically stable, with economic resilience, and a developing tourism industry.
In late 2024, the big development for Mauritius was the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands. The UK handed over the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, but the Brits and the Americans maintain the lease of Diego Garcia, a military base included in the Chagos Archipelago. For the UK and the US, this acts as a vital refuelling station in the Indian Ocean.
When the United States launched its strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025, it was expected that Diego Garcia would be used as a location from which to launch, as it was during the Iraq War and the Afghanistan conflict.
Some B-2s did fly to Guam on that day, but they were used as a decoy. It was expected they would fly from Guam to Diego Garcia to refuel and then attack Iran from there.
This wasn’t the case, with the B-2s flying direct to Iran from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and back again, refuelling aerially.
Despite not being used during this operation, Diego Garcia is a vital military location for the United States and the United Kingdom, and it will continue to remain important.
For Mauritius, the key question for 2026 will be how the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands affects the nation. When the 50-year U.S-UK agreement was signed with Mauritius in 1966, the deal included the Chagos Islands not having any resident population at all. This rule will remain on Diego Garcia, but the forced removal of the Chagossians back in 1966 could be reversed, and the other islands could be resettled.
Some expect China to pursue closer economic ties with Mauritius, to secure itself some geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean. Previously, China has provided Mauritius with loans and a currency swap agreement, as well as Chinese technology and infrastructure.
India is also a strategic and economic partner in maritime security with Mauritius due to their shared proximity in the Indian Ocean. India was a key supporter of Mauritius and its claim over the Chagos Islands.
In 2026, I expect Mairutius to maintain the same level of stability and to continue to maintain its strong economic growth. The nation is on the rise.
Morocco
Morocco will continue to consolidate its influence and control over Western Sahara in 2026. The region is valuable for phosphates, Morocco’s fishing industry, and infrastructure that allows Morocco to expand its long-term economic and geopolitical goals as a bridge between Europe and Africa.
In recent years, nations have recognised Moroccan control of Western Sahara diplomatically, and consulates have been opened by African and Arab nations in Laayoune and Dakhla. These moves are typically seen to translate to differing levels of support for Morocco’s pursuits.
This is a slower-moving geopolitical issue in comparison to others I’ve discussed today, and Morocco knows time is on its side. Western Sahara is divided into Moroccan administrative regions and governed by Moroccan-appointed officials. Settlement is also encouraged for Moroccans via higher public-sector wages and housing incentives. Slow progress will likely continue.
Algeria backs the Polisario Front that exists in the South of the Western Sahara, beyond Morocco’s 2700km sand wall, which it constructed decades ago. The group seeks independence for Western Sahara as a part of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Many of themembers of the Polisario Front are refugees living in Algeria.
This region will continue to be a proxy arena, albeit one that doesn’t spark often. The conflict is largely frozen, and because of unbalanced power dynamics, it sees limited active violence.
Outside of Western Sahara, Morocco may have to face a deeper domestic issue in 2026. The nation maintains the memory of Gen Z protests from 2025.
Starting in September 2025, the younger generations protested in many nations due to socio-economic grievances. In Morocco, reports indicated over 400 protestors were detained, and that in the aftermath, 1500 participants faced prosecution. Political rhetoric in the aftermath noted that it recognised the social concerns, and announcements were aimed at addressing youth employment and service quality. However, this isn’t an easy societal fix. Other nations, such as Nepal and Madagascar, saw these protests lead to regime change.
This isn’t isolated to Morocco, but as a result of this conundrum, I expect societal shifts in the coming years and decades. This issue could remain in the form of protests in 2026, but it’s a long-term issue that many nations will be seeking to address with as little internal tension as possible. This will be one of Morocco’s biggest aims in 2026.
Mozambique
Islamic State insurgents remain active in Mozambique, specifically in the Northern region of Cabo Delgado. Since 2017, armed attacks from extremist group Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama have displaced over one million people, and in late 2024, Cyclone Cido damaged over 150,000 homes. Further cyclones named Dikeledi and Jude damaged many more. In August 2025, further violence led to even more displacement. Unfortunately, this cycle of violence in Mozambique seems to be escalating.
Mozambique does have opportunities in the energy sector. Mozambique LNG is a TotalEnergies-led project that is set to be restarted as of October 2025. ExxonMobil and ENI are also planning projects, yet timetables remain unknown. There is an opportunity for Mozambique to become a regional logistics hub for Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, but security and natural disaster issues remain.
Mozambique also relies heavily on energy revenues and has engaged with the IMF before, just like Gabon. Diversification likely won’t come in 2026, but could be necessary in the coming years. The insurgency in the north is the biggest primary risk for Mozambique, but the nation has high potential, especially due to its Indian Ocean access.
Nigeria
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, with a population of 238 million people, a strong birth rate and a youthful population. This gives Nigeria the potential to have a huge domestic consumption market and a large labour force. The nation is also important for energy exports and regional diplomacy through ECOWAS, in which Nigeria retains political influence in Western Africa.
However, as Trump’s strikes on Nigeria on Christmas Day in 2025 demonstrate, Nigeria has multiple security crises. Notably, these strikes were carried out as part of a joint operation.
Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remain active in Northern Nigeria.
The latest clashes between the two groups were seen in November 2025 near Lake Chad. ISWAP split from Boko Haram in 2016, and since then, both groups have been in territorial conflict for influence in the Lake Chad region.
In mid-2025, military assets belonging to Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria in the Lake Chad area were described as under threat from ISWAP. As focus was on ISWAP, Boko Haram resurged in 2025, and the clashes in November 2025 arose.
The December 2025 strikes didn’t hit either group, however. It was a smaller group, known as Lakurawa, that was hit. This group has connections to networks in the Sahel states of Mali and Niger, but they are still ISIS-linked militants.
Trump has labelled Nigeria as a “country of concern” due to his belief that Christians in Nigeria have been targeted by attacks. According to research by Acled, most victims of these attacks have been Muslim.
Moving into 2026, I expect that the United States will want to continue tackling IS-linked groups. We saw the United States strike ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2025, and I suspect Trump will continue to target ISIS in 2026. As a result, Nigeria could see more U.S. strikes on its territory. If this works to address Nigeria’s security issues, that’s great news for them.
Outside of this, Nigeria faces high youth unemployment and youth dissatisfaction, as many nations of the world do. They, too, could be susceptible to rising internal tension if changes to societal models aren’t pursued.
Somalia and Somaliland
As I discussed in the Ethiopia section, tensions remain between Somalia and Somaliland. As we move into 2026, the Israelis have become the first nation to formally recognise Somaliland as an independent state. This could mark the beginning of the next chapter in this conflict.
Israel has expressed interest in cooperation with Somaliland in agriculture, health, technology, and the economy. But, many suspect the main reason for Israeli recognition is due to Israel needing allies in the Red Sea for strategic reasons against the Houthis and Iran. Israel’s recognition received widespread condemnation from Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the African Union, Yemen, Sudan, Nigeria, and Qatar, among others.
Other nations, such as the UAE and Ethiopia, benefit from their port access in Somaliland and so hold more favourable relations with Somaliland.
This is shaping the Horn of Africa as a true territorial influence battle that will persist over the coming years.
As for Somalia, the Trump Administration has also been active against ISIS-Somalia via military strikes. Al-Shabaab has also been a target of these U.S. strikes. Somalia has been in conflict with Al-Shabaab since 2007, and this has seen internal tension remain elevated in Somalia.
Trump’s strikes on Somalia have outpaced strikes launched by Bush, Obama, and Biden combined. Also, strikes in December were reported by Drop Site News to have killed at least 11 civilians.
The United States has been allied with the Somali government, training forces and having troops based in the country. In February 2024, the United States also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somalia, agreeing to build 5 military bases for the Somali National Army.
But a U.S. presence in the region also benefits the United States individually. It gives them surveillance opportunities in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al-Manbad Strait. Also, it is close in proximity to the Middle East, especially the Houthis in Yemen and Iran.
Luckily for the United States, Somalia is keen to deepen this partnership. A 2025 letter from Somalia President Mohamud to Trump offered the United States exclusive operational control of a collection of air bases and ports, including Balidogle in Somalia. The other two assets offered were the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, which complicates matters due to the territorial dispute, and a port and air base in Bosaso, which exists in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland.
In 2026, I expect tensions to remain between Somalia and Somaliland, with potential clashes also. Somalia views Somaliland recognition as a violation of its territorial integrity, and with the first nation formally recognising Somaliland, this process has escalated as we have entered 2026.
Also, Somalia is expected to head to the polls unless more delays unfold.
For the United States, I expect it to maintain interest in counterterrorism in Somalia and beyond. For Somalia specifically, the United States is more likely to remain involved due to the independent advantages that a U.S. presence in Somalia grants it.
South Africa
South Africa is one of the largest economies in Africa, and hence is looked towards in determining the general trends that the entire continent could face in the coming decades. As a result of this leadership position, South Africa holds soft power on the continent.
In 2025, South Africa hosted the G20. This marked the first time the summit had been held on the African continent. The theme of the summit was “solidarity, equality, and sustainability”. This reflects not only the hope for South Africa, but the hope for the entire African continent for a more inclusive future. Notably, the United States didn’t attend, and China and Russia both sent officials rather than the heads of state. Still, this was a notable occasion for South Africa and the entire continent.
The key discussions at the G20 were the high cost of capital in Africa and the need to narrow inflation to incite further investment in the continent. If a project’s investment return is going to be lower than the rate of inflation, there is no incentive to invest.
But, like many nations around the world, geopolitical and trade tensions elsewhere could lead to sticky inflation.
As we enter 2026, South Africa is one of the nations that maintains its case at the International Court of Justice against Israel for genocide in Gaza. Brazil, Ireland, Spain, Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, and Belgium have also joined or intervened in favour of South Africa. The ICJ has granted extensions for Israel to formulate written responses. As a result, this case will continue into 2026, and South Africa will be heavily involved.
Finally, as a member of BRICS, South Africa hopes that it can push for more influence over development, trade, and investment from the other members of the group and the group’s financial structures, such as the BRICS New Development Bank.
South Africa hopes it can benefit from such facilities associated with BRICS while remaining a balanced regional geopolitical power in Africa.
Sudan and South Sudan
The conflict in Sudan is one of the deadliest and one of the least discussed of any in the world.
This conflict started in April 2023 when a power struggle broke out between the Sudanese Army (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is a Sudanese paramilitary group established in August 2013. Since then, over 8 million people have been internally displaced, and over 3 million have fled to neighbouring countries.
We’re currently seeing the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, call for an immediate ceasefire. This follows a peace initiative presented by Sudan’s Prime Minister Kamil Idris to the UN Security Council. This initiative called for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to disarm. The RSF rejected this.
The regions of the worst conflict in Sudan are Kordofan and Darfur. In El-Fasher, a city in Darfur, Yale University released a report documenting mass killings by the RSF. The report included satellite imagery showing mass burning.
The conflict also risks spilling into other nations, with a drone attack killing two Chadian soldiers a few weeks ago.
There is, unfortunately, no strong indication that any part of this peace pursuit is going to lead to positive developments.
RSF leader Hemedti is dismissing any peace pursuit involving disarmament or withdrawal from the 40% of Sudanese territory that the group controls. In a recent comment, he described this pursuit as “fantasy”.
The SAF has also rejected multiple efforts for peacekeeping forces within Sudan in the past.
With the conflict looking set to continue due to a lack of positive peace progress, I suspect 2026 could bring a war of greater attrition that continues throughout the year, or the less likely scenario of a Sudan partition. Sudanese partition, if eventually this becomes the reality, would likely have effects that spanned much further past the end of 2026. This scenario also wouldn’t guarantee the end of the conflict.
This conflict remaining beyond 2026 is also more likely due to its proxy status. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Algeria, Libya, the UAE, Turkey, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Russia, Chad, and South Sudan have had some involvement in this conflict, be it via support, mediation, or weapon transfers.
Ethiopia and Eritrea support the RSF since the group fought alongside them against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in 2022. Egypt supports the opposite side, the Sudanese Army (SAF). This is a potential geopolitical spark that could also see tensions rise between Egypt and Ethiopia.
Of other nations, Chad has been accused of facilitating and delivering weapons from the UAE to the RSF, as has Libya.
To further convey how big a proxy war this is, a few years ago, there were some media reports of Ukrainian activity in Sudan to rival the Wagner Group, which controlled multiple gold mines in Sudan that were controlled by the RSF. Paradoxically, the Russians today frequently support the SAF at the UN Security Council.
Due to so many of these nations having ulterior motives and interests in Sudan on both sides of the conflict, the likelihood of successful mediation in the Sudanese conflict falls even further. Unfortunately, this conflict seems to be ingrained, with little sign of positive progress.
A few decades ago, South Sudan was also a huge part of this conflict.
Between 1955 and 1972, the First Sudanese Civil War was fought between the territory of Sudan and South Sudan when both were a part of Sudan. The Second Sudanese Civil War lasted from 1983 to 2005. After peace, South Sudan held a referendum for independence in 2011, which passed. Today, South Sudan seeks stability and neutrality. They agree to export crude oil to both the Sudanese government and the RSF. Unfortunately for South Sudan, any exports heading through Sudan and beyond are limited by the civil war. This significantly impacts their economy since they are a landlocked nation.
South Sudan is also still at threat from persistent domestic militias, and from cross-border tensions with Sudan.
Tensions could also spark internally in South Sudan in 2026 if elections are delayed. They are currently scheduled to be held on December 22nd, 2026.
The Sahel States
The Sahel states of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have all undergone coups in the last few years. This has then led to a tightening of relations with Russia.
At first, this improvement in relations was done through the Wagner Group. After the death of Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia phased out Wagner and replaced it with a state-controlled entity called the “Africa Corps”.
In 2019, Mali’s government signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia, and following the 2020 coup, the Wagner Group arrived at the new junta’s request. The Africa Corps arrived in Mali in January 2025 and remains today.
After the 2022 coup in Burkina Faso, the new junta leader forced out French forces and called Russia a “strategic ally”. The first Africa Corps personnel arrived in late 2023.
As for Niger, following the July 2023 coup, members of the Africa Corps arrived in December 2023, just as French forces left. In the following year, U.S. forces also left Niger. The U.S. left behind its $110m base. Today, Russian military advisors are housed at Air Base 101 in Niger’s capital, Niamey.
In the past year, the three Sahel states formally left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). They subsequently formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AoSS).
Outside of these strategies, the region pursues Turkish drones, training, Gulf funding, and increased intelligence. These pursuits are all undertaken with the aim of greater security for the Sahel states.
Russia’s footprint in the Sahel is one of the nation’s strongest global footprints outside of its own borders. In November 2025, it was suspected that thousands of African citizens had been recruited to fight for Russia in Ukraine. It’s the Africa Corps armed forces that would pursue this recruitment.
In 2026, the question is whether the Russian Africa Corps can help tame any potential insurgencies in the Sahel states. If Russia isn’t sufficiently addressing these insurgencies, expect instability to naturally rise across the region.
Pro-democracy protests occurred in May 2025 in Niger and Mali, which could lead to negative attitudes towards Russian influence in the Sahel nations, even if they do sufficiently quash any regional insurgencies.
Another question to ask regarding the Sahel states is their relations with other nations. Could we see relations warm with the Chinese, for example? Or, perhaps even a return of Western nations that were previously cast out?
One issue here for Western nations is that the Sahel states experienced coups in the first place due to the rejection of former French colonial pressure and control. The United States were also forced out of its base in Niger in September 2024.
These pursuits typically align more with the multipolar approach to global governance that is promoted by the Chinese and the Russians. The Sahel states likely won’t return to their previous geopolitical environment if they have the choice.
The biggest question I have for the Sahel nations in 2026 is whether the Russians can maintain their role as a security guarantor or if internal tensions will rise, leading to some changes.
Concluding Remarks
I can’t cover every nation in Africa, but I hope this list provides a fairly extensive coverage of the region.
In many of these nations embroiled in conflict, it looks unlikely that de-escalation will occur. There could be temporary pauses, but the general trend in 2026 is a world of greater instability.
But it’s not all doom and gloom. Africa as a continent remains focused on infrastructure, investment, and development. The continent possesses rich resources, and its importance on the global stage is only set to grow.
Do you agree or disagree with any of my scenario analysis predictions for 2026? Let me know in the comments. As always, I’m open to discussing these points.
On Thursday, I’ll continue my 2026 scenario analysis exploration by exploring Latin America. I plan to dive deeper into the Venezuela situation as a part of this discussion.
I’ll explore if this is an organised deal between the United States and Venezuela, before analysing what direction we could head in over the coming weeks, months, and years. Come back on Thursday for that discussion.
Thanks for reading! I’d greatly appreciate it if you were to like or share this post with others! If you want more, then subscribe on Substack for these posts directly to your email inbox. I research history, geopolitics, and financial markets to understand the world and the people around us. If any of my work helps you be more prepared and ease your mind, that’s great. If you like what you read, please share this with others.
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Solid deep dive. The coltan supply chain angle in the DRC is often underappreciated, especially how Rwanda's exports spike while crossborder conflict continues. I've been tracking similar resource politics in other regions, and the pattern really tracks when external powers prioritize access over stabilty. The U.S.-brokered "peace" deal clearly aimed more at diversifying supply chains away from China than addressing root causes in North Kivu.
Whether one agrees or not, the value here is the ‘consequences framing’—policy as a chain reaction across allies, markets, and institutions. That’s the angle too much daily coverage misses.
-Noble