Geopolitics Review - 7th October 2024
Israel Moves Into Lebanon and Iran’s Missile Attack
Contents
Introduction
The Background
The Latest Escalation
The Iran Response
Netanyahu Needs War
An Emboldened Israel, And An Iran With Few Cards To Play
Axelrod’s Tournament
Applying Axelrod’s Tournament
Concluding Remarks
Bitesize Edition
The October 7th attack unfolded one year to this day, as Hamas crossed into Israel, killing over 1200 people. Many were in their family homes, or attending a music festival. These were everyday people living their lives, and they were murdered without remorse. Today we’ve seen many Israelis gather today to hold a memorial at the festival site.
Many things changed on that unforgivable day for millions of people. One thing that has been clear since that day, is that Israel will not forget.
Since that day, we’ve continued to escalate in the Middle East. Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran itself have all joined Israel, Palestine, and Hamas in this conflict, along with many other geopolitical players who have direct or indirect connections to the conflict.
I wrote most of this piece before October 1st, upon which date we saw Iran launch 180 missiles at Israel. With Israel’s moves into Lebanon itself, I had enough to discuss regarding the Middle East. However, this conflict’s latest chapter with the Iran missile attack took me back into a deeper exploration of the background of the Middle East’s history, the Israel-Iran conflict, and game theory of the present conflict.
In a regional conflict that has continued to escalate for an entire year, how can we even begin to look forward towards a reduction of tensions? How can we avoid the current direction of travel towards an irreversible conflict, or are we inevitably driving uncontrollably down that road? Find out more below.
Introduction
One year to the day, October 7th, we saw the heinous, unforgivable attack from Hamas on Israel. Much has unfolded since that dreaded day, including 41,000 Palestinian deaths, many of which were innocent children and civilians. A special thanks to
for the recent piece I’ll link below that certainly inspired many parts this piece. One quote stood out for me:“The scene is a tragic reminder that in the theatre of human suffering, the innocent often pay the highest price for the sins of the powerful.”
The piece dives into the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in detail and is worth a read to highlight the unimaginably harsh environment the Gaza Strip has now become, as well as where Israel finds itself today. It’s clearer today more than ever, that innocents are paying the highest price.
We recently saw the news that Israel har amassed tanks on the Northern border with Lebanon, but today this seems like a lifetime ago. Thousands have fled the country in recent days, indicating some escalation was expected after the death of Hezbollah leader, Nasrallah.
A ground operation into Lebanon by Israel has since commenced. Key questions that arise are what happens next. Is Hezbollah in flux, and how will Iran and the rest of the world react to this next escalation in the Middle East?
Note: I wrote parts of this piece before the Iranian missile attack on Israel. If I contradict myself anywhere, don’t hesitate to let me know. I’ve spent time making corrections and editing but there’s a chance I miss some parts that require edits.
The Background
I’ve previously covered the history of Israel in a 13-part series and recently updated this in a 3-part series which can be found in written or podcast form. All can be found through the link below, but since my most recent update in July, there are some more thoughts I’d like to get out.
Firstly, Israel itself wants to be a majority Jewish state. This in my view, is one reason why a one-state solution is unrealistic. It would see victims and aggressors living in the same environment. Would that create an environment of stability? In my view, it wouldn’t. It would create an environment similar to the one we see today, where Israel calls the shots and the future of the Palestinian people remains threatened and undetermined by themselves.
The two-state solution has geographical problems as seen below. How do you navigate the passage of land between the West Bank and Gaza that would travel through Israel? This is only looking at the issue on the surface level. Books could be written on the two-state solution alone. It is clear, however, that adjustments need to be made.
Would a three-state solution work? It seems support is weak for this scenario.
One thing is clear, each solution has problems that need to be addressed. Both sides must be incentivised to pursue cooperation if we want a solution to be reached. This certainly isn’t occurring today. In my opinion, this requires some international pressure on Israel. They have a right to defend themselves and to ensure their security, but they don’t have any right to indiscriminately bomb innocent civilians.
Another aspect of the deep-routed background of this conflict involves the wider Middle East. Saudi Arabia has backed Palestinian statehood, stating that no normalisation of relations with Israel will occur without Palestinian statehood. Hence, normalisation is conditional on the statehood of Palestine. Why can’t normalization and Palestinian statehood occur in sync, as part of a regionwide pursuit of peace and an end to conflict in a region in flux? Ending conflict in the Middle East at present is unrealistic. Iran still sits to the East, and its proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis continue to act more freely than Iran, which is restricted through its strategy of strategic patience. But, by normalization between Israel and other Arab States, an environment of neutrality is better than one of hostility, and it’s a foundation upon which greater cooperation can be built.
Yet, we find ourselves in an environment where we seem to find bad actors at every turn. An important distinction here is between Hamas and Palestine. Hamas is a terror group, that launched a heinous attack on Israel and hence need to be removed from power, to ensure they can’t launch such an attack again. In contrast, Palestine is a state that has been subject to violence at the hands of Israel, and internally from Hamas who has weaponised the harsh conditions of individual Palestinian citizens for its own selfish gain. Hamas have to be removed from power, but not at the cost of innocent Palestinians.
Israel for decades has delayed a solution because it is in a position of power. They continue to destroy Palestinian settlements in the West Bank without repercussions and hence gain further power at the expense of Palestinian citizens. Political leaders in Israel are incentivized to continue a war, gain more power, and maintain their own political careers. Netanyahu without a war would face his corruption charges. All these bad actors contribute to why no peace deal has been reached in the past that would stand the test of time. All that seems like an agreement is temporary. Some political leaders have even faced assassination attempts for pushing for peace between Israel and Palestine, and some attempts were successful. If you’re Israel in the driver’s seat, gaining more power, why divert from your main route and change approach? There’s no incentive for Israel to, especially when the policy of the West is to support Israel, whether via attempts to weaken Iran or as a consequence of a relationship with the United States, which is seemingly pursuing the same goal. There’s also no incentive to pursue peace when as history has shown, your own life could be at risk.
Iran is also bad actor in this region. Some have defended Iran for being backed into a corner by the assassination of Haniyeh on Iranian soil, the pager incident in Lebanon, and the death of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah. Some view that Iran had to respond to the moves being made against it. But, Iran has been acting via its proxies for the last year of this conflict. This allows Iran itself to maintain strategic patience. To sit back and paint a picture of a state that seeks de-escalation. Yet, “death to America” and “death to Israel” are damning statements. Whether pursued directly by Iran, or via its proxies, the statements indicate Iran’s intentions and will continue to as we move forward, whether seen directly through Iranian policy, or via its proxies.
In summary, the Middle East is incentivized for war. This is especially true in Israel and Palestine, where the far-right government and Hamas exist at the extreme ends of this conflict, as both further their individual interests with this conflict. Fatah, the Palestinian Authority, and some in Israel are more open to peace. It’s this midground that should be pursued, but this takes time and education, as I’ve detailed previously. A solution to conflict in the Middle East won’t happen quickly. It will require decades to change attitudes and convince those in the Middle East that the benefits of peace outweigh the instability of war.
The history of previous centuries has contributed to creating this environment. Power isn’t grabbed by one state in the Middle East today, and so geopolitical moves see member nations of the region grapple for power vacuums that were created during previous geopolitical environments, such as the age of colonialism. Skyes-Picot saw the British and French distribute a region between themselves.But this region has a deep, rich ethnic history. This ethnic history continues to drive decisions from geopolitical players today, but the British and French leaving the Middle East left the region in flux. The United States’ activity in the region, and also Russian and Chinese influences continue to drive the region down the same road today. The civil war in Syria is one such example where multiple players contribute to the conflict. This is one contributing reason as to why the Syrian Civil War is described as a proxy war.
One example of positive progress in the volatile Middle East is China’s brokered peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The deal is holding longer than some expected and hence leads me to ponder the question of why are both incentivized to maintain this peace. How can an entire region that has been embroiled in power-grabbing and emerging vacuums be incentivised to pursue peace as Iran and Saudi Arabia seemingly have, after decades of being geopolitical rivals? Is it economic benefits, or even going as far as economic interdependence? Do Saudi Arabia and Iran both benefit from China’s large energy needs, and hence benefit from maintaining peace with each other? It’s this same strategy that has driven the Abraham Accords forward. An economic relationship with Israel is by decades of technological development fuelled by the United States, an economic relationship with the United States. Hence an incentive for peace arises.
We’re reaching a global geopolitical environment where the Palestinian statehood question especially is receiving global attention, as it should be. However, for any progress to be made when actors such as Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are incentivized to continue the war, we need more powerful actors to step in or a re-alignment of incentives. The Middle East often benefits from instability and the power changes that come with it. Hence, the underlying cycle of conflict needs to be broken by incentivising peace in the Middle East, as is seen through the China-brokered deal. The latest escalation between Israel, and Hezbollah and Iran takes us away from this scenario.
The Latest Escalation
This amass of Israeli tanks on the border with Lebanon isn’t the only escalation that has occurred recently. Israel also hit Yemen with air attacks targeting the major ports of Ras Isa and Hodeidah. Israel also targeted power stations controlled by the Houthi Rebels, hitting Ras Khatib, al-Hali, and Corniche power stations. An oil terminal at Ras Issa was also hit. These attacks will affect millions in Yemen, as blackouts have been reported in the aftermath.
The target of Israel’s latest moves is clear: Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
The pager incident was another event that has occurred recently, covered in detail via an article from the Washington Post. After the October 7th attack, one year ago to this day, it was discussed how it was possible that Israeli intelligence missed it. With the pager attack and the subsequent attacks on Hezbollah leaders, it’s clear Israel is integrated within Hezbollah, and that their intelligence capabilities remain strong.
Over 3000 Hezbollah members were injured as the tough, durable AR924 pagers were remotely detonated by Mossad. It was suspected that the plan started planning in 2022, before Hamas’ attack in October 2023. A Taiwanese company involved in the supply chain of the pagers are said to have no prior knowledge of the explosive nature of said pagers, and so Israel and Mossad had access to the pagers prior to their travels through the global supply chain. Many in Israel’s government also had no knowledge of the pager tampering, as didn’t the United States. It was ultimately Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to trigger the explosions on September 17th. Israel in the days afterwards started aerial airstrikes on Hezbollah’s headquarters. September 28th marked the day when Nasrallah’s death was broadcast to the world, and Iran geared up to respond. A threat this successful against one of Iran’s proxy groups couldn’t go unresponded in the view of Iran. This is especially after no response came directly from Iran after Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran in July.
On October 2nd, we saw Iran launch 180 missiles at Israel. The attack has been painted by Israel and the United States as a failure. The Iron Dome intercepted many missiles, but more got through than did in Iran’s attack in April. Let’s explore Iran’s response in more detail.
The Iran Response
I wrote most of this post on Tuesday the 1st of October. You might note that Iran did respond with a missile attack on Israel named Operation True Promise 2 later on the same day.
It seems Israel moved too far in the eyes of the Iranians, and launched a missile attack that was described as “twice the size” of the April missile attack. Many missiles made it through Israel’s air defence, and it seems hypersonic missiles were also utilised by Iran.
A contributing reasoning for Iran’s attack was the death of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, and the attack on Lebanon by Israel that occurred after the pager attacks. Again, prior to the attack by Iran, the United States and hence Israel were warned beforehand. As a result, all of Israel’s F-35s were airborne, to reduce potential damages against them in Iranian attacks on military airbases. We also know the United States forces in the Mediterranean worked to attempt to intercept some of the Iranian missiles.
The next question I’ll ask is whether this is another batch of geopolitical theatre. In response to this, I’d argue it doesn’t matter if it is or isn’t anymore, although the potential of the attack being broadcasted on global news media beforehand demonstrates some theatrical element. Iran stated if Israel responds to its missile attack, so will they. Shortly after Israel vowed to respond. Hence, we’re in a period of tit-for-tat with, in my opinion, no immediate reprieve. Could Iran be reined in by its own strategy of strategic patience, or perhaps the Chinese, a loosening of sanctions, or alternative pressure? On the other side of the conflict, good luck getting Israel to listen to anybody unless the United States exercises some increased pressure on the Israelis.
It’s clear Iran feels weak after Haniyeh’s death occurred in Tehran. In Iran’s view, it reached a point where they had to demonstrate power and challenge this narrative. Rhetoric is all well and good, but if Israel does responds, will Iran once again sit back and wait? Or will we see Israel return a lighter attack that Iran brushes off as weak once again and hence doesn’t seek a response? Many questions, all of which boil down to whether we see the same situation as in April with a scaled-down Israeli response or a stronger response that Iran then responds back to with an even stronger attack. The Iranians have stated they didn’t use any of their most advanced missile capabilities, implying they will attack using stronger weapons if prompted. Hence, do we enter a period of escalation or de-escalation?
Netanyahu Needs War
In my most recent series of updates on Israel, I stated that Benjamin Netanyahu needs a war. His far-right coalition government was formed after Netanyahu ran out of political road. He can’t go any further to the right, and so he has to appease far-right figures in Israeli politics such as Smolrich and Ben-Gvir to remain in power. Without them, the coalition has the potential to collapse.
This government is fragile, as has been seen in Israel’s recent political history, with four inconclusive elections occurring between 2019 and 2021. If Netanyahu wants to remain in power, it’s those on the far right holding his government together that he must appease. Typically, these parties hold more aggressive policies against Palestinians, and oppose Palestinian statehood.
Netanyahu is also incentivised personally to remain in power as this is delaying him from facing the consequences of his corruption trial which is still ongoing.
Hence, Netanyahu needs a strong reason to remain in power that his far-right government will be in support, and that currently is being reflected through war. However, looking at the destruction in the Gaza Strip it seems the conflict there was declining. How can Israel continue to justify further destruction in a region that has been destroyed? They can’t, and so, as I stated in July, Netanyahu needs a new war. Thankfully in his view, Hezbollah was giving enough reasons to justify another war and has been since Hezbollah started rocket attacks one day after Hamas’ attack on October 7th last year. Rocket attacks have been traded between the two since this day, but now with the pager escalation and the death of Hezbollah leader Nasrallah, Israel clearly smells blood in the water and it making clear moves against Hezbollah. Tanks amassed on the border, and the ground operation commenced shortly after.
One element of this entire conflict that Hezbollah escalated was stating that Israeli citizens wouldn’t be able to return to the North unless the conflict in Gaza ended. Attacks from Hezbollah on Israel were conditional on the war in Gaza ending, as were the Houthi Rebels attacks on Israel and the disruption in the Red Sea. Yet, even after 41,000 deaths, the war in Gaza doesn’t end. Netanyahu stated Hamas must be removed from power, as it should be after the heinous October 7th attacks. But I question how much more can Hamas be removed from power in the Gaza Strip. How much more destruction needs to occur of infrastructure and innocent civilians for Israel to see its goals as achieved? Or are its goals a smokescreen, an unachievable goal that allows Israel a reason to continue its attacks on innocent Palestinians?
The current pathway of conflict has now given geopolitical actors in the Middle East no further choice. We’re escalating further.
An Emboldened Israel, And An Iran With Few Cards To Play
Every country has a right to defend itself. Iran acts through its proxies, and so it can be easy to view Iran’s current stance and see them as the one country seeking to de-escalate, after not responding directly to the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. However, Iran does respond through increased attacks via Hezbollah and the Houthis. It’s such proxy groups of Iran that Israel is targeting now.
Again, the approach by Israel is one of worry. Huge explosions continue to rock Beirut, and these see civilians suffer further.
In the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, 80% of all goods enter, including food and aid for citizens in a war-torn country. This will limit the operational capabilities of the Houthis, while also impacting civilians who now have to experience blackouts, a lack of food, and a lack of aid.
My comments here aren’t to defend groups who spread hate, and violence, and contribute to escalation, but methods to conflict must be seen to limit civilian casualties. No side in this wider Middle Eastern conflict is pursuing such a goal, but they continue unpunished.
Israel has been unhindered in its pursuit of its goals. In fact, calls for reduced weapons exports to Israel have been met by few states and even fewer have only enforced limited exports, not total bans. Netanyahu has openly scolded Emmanuel Macron this week for considering such a strategy to pressure Israel.
All this is unfolding on an open stage, seen by everyone around the world. But, behind the curtain, lurks the Israel-Iran conflict. The Israel-Iran conflict here is the one that has risen to take centre stage. Israel’s moves are now to weaken Iranian proxies, who possess significant influence from Iran proper, all the way to Lebanon on the Mediterranean.
Before Iran’s response of 180 missiles, I wrote the following:
The question in the back of everybody’s minds, is does Iran itself continue to exercise strategic patience, vowing revenge at a time and place it deems fit, while rarely responding directly? Or do these attacks on the proxy groups lead to an escalation directly by Iran? It’s been viewed that Iran’s lack of direct response to the assassinations of Hamas leader Haniyeh within Iran was a sign of weakness that Israel is now exploiting with its recent acts. I believe what it was very clearly a sign of, is that Iran has very few cards to play.
The attack in April was a batch of geopolitical theatre. The United States and Iran communicated through backchannels via the Swiss, and the UAVs and missiles were intercepted with no injuries. Without the safety of theatre, how could Iran respond as its proxies weaken? Typically adopting patience, if Israel continues to attack and escalate against Iran, for how long does Iran individually sit and take it? Iran has few cards left to play. Their lack of response may have currently avoided all-out war directly between Israel and Iran, but the underlying trend is one of continued escalation? This is true of both sides. Iran just responds via its proxies.
Israel named the operation that eliminated Nasrallah “New Order”. As Israel continues to escalate, it’s likely Iran wouldn’t be a fan of what Israel views as a new order. It’s likely that direct attacks on Iran, key political figures, or moves that limit Iran’s influence in the Middle East would garner some move in response. Iran’s missile attack on Israel was the point where Iran considered “enough was enough”. Iran’s influence could decline via a collapse of its proxies and hence it must defend this. It would place Iran in a vulnerable position, after all, as I stated earlier, Iran acting through its proxies allows it to maintain the view that it is de-escalating. Without its proxies, how can they maintain strategic patience? This would be problematic for Iran’s geopolitical approach.
We can debate potential future scenarios all we want. I believe in a conflict that runs so deep, we need a long term approach. What must be balanced here is that any move either side plays must deter the other side from an escalatory response. In other words, Israeli moves shouldn’t be so strong that Iran, its proxies, or its influence, are too strongly threatened, and vice-versa. If Israel, Iran, or the proxy groups go too far, we risk the Israel-Iran war taking yet another nasty turn.
It might not seem particularly prudent regarding this real-world situation, but I’m going to discuss an experiment from the 1980s, specifically Axelrod’s Tournament, and how we can apply it to today’s issues plaguing the Middle East.
Axelrod’s Tournament
In exploring tit-for-tat, there’s no better model than the experiments undertaken by Robert Axelrod in the 1980s.
Axelrod held a competition involving the Prisoner’s Dilemma. For a background on what the Prisoner’s Dilemma is, check out my coverage here:
I include a simplified version in the piece above, but the general connection here is that Prisoner’s Dilemma can be used as a model for geopolitical relations between two actors.
Axelrod’s tournament saw him invite prominent figures in game theory to submit a strategy that when competing against another player in a set number of rounds, could choose to cooperate or defect. The aim was to figure out which strategy would attain the highest success rate. In a geopolitical context, when interacting with another geopolitical actor, what strategy should be adopted for the greatest gain? Of course, this can be positive-sum and benefit both players or zero-sum, with one player losing what the other gains. This raises an interesting question as to whether geopolitics is zero-sum or positive-sum, a question I find myself returning to in my writing.
The tournament led to many creative strategies from the players, and some less creative. Some players submitted a computer program that defected every time. Although you can never be taken advantage of in this strategy, you also miss out on positive gains from potential cooperation. Surprisingly, this wasn’t the optimal strategy in Axelrod’s Tournament. We also had “always cooperate” strategy. This strategy benefitted from positive gains from other cooperating or “good” strategies but were heavily taken advantage of by defectors, or “bad” strategies. There were also randomised strategies that would cooperate 50% of the time.
As these strategies were all created individually and submitted to Axelrod prior to the tournament, the participants had no knowledge of how other strategies would behave. However, those strategies that tried to predict behaviour of other players, and hence incorporated this into their strategies, came out as the better performers.
The winning strategy in Axelrod’s tournament was tit-for-tat. It cooperated to start on the first turn of the game but then copied the opponent’s previous move. If an actor escalated with a defection while you cooperated, you would then defect on the next turn.
To this day, it remains a model we see in the real world for allies and rivals in geopolitics. Tit-for-tat with an all-cooperating strategy sees allies enter into positive-sum games. They help each other and thus benefit and advance their individual interests. The always-defect strategy leads to a cycle of escalation seen today by geopolitical rivals in the Middle East. The always-randomise strategy can model geopolitical players who are playing the game of geopolitics, but who are neither allies nor rivals.
The important element to remember here is that the behaviour of other players affects the geopolitical environment. Even if tit-for-tat comes up against a random strategy, it sinks to the level of the random strategy. In this world, we allow the bad actors to be the determinant of the environment.
Hence, there is no “best” strategy. It depends on the actions of the other players. To return to the earlier question of whether geopolitics is positive-sum or zero-sum, I’d conclude it’s whatever we decide it is. We determine the environment with our actions.
So, if the Middle East is embroiled in an environment of bad actors who continue to defect, how do we respond to this? In environments where bad actors continuously defect, how can we limit the direction of perpetually rising escalation?
Applying Axelrod’s Tournament
Understanding other players in the game and seeking to incentivise cooperation is difficult, but not impossible.
In the case of Israel and Iran, we’re clearly in an escalation.
Axelrod’s tournament highlights that we can’t blindly choose strategy. We have to seek to understand the situation and adapt based on our opponent. This is the true game of geopolitics. But, it’s tense. You don’t know how your opponent will react to a defection.
Axelrod’s tournament categorised cooperation and defection as individual functions with no level of scalability. But, in the real world, a defection in one turn can be imbalanced from the previous defection made by another player. Hence arises an environment of escalatory tit-for-tat where one player seeks to respond with greater force than the previous move another player made. A concept I’ve discussed before, the brink, is prevalent in this scenario. We approach the brink in the Middle East as escalations continue to rise towards a point of no return. When we’re heading towards the brink, the point where we slip into irreversible damage and conflict, how can we pull back?
Tit-for-tat moves must be de-escalatory in nature. We need to respond to aggressive moves, without risking a more escalatory move in response. In this case, we pull back from the brink. Another strategy is to have a more powerful player enter the game, and provide a backstop for escalation or to mediate. They force de-escalation upon the players, who can exit the game for a period, which could be interpreted as cooperation.
Axelrod’s tournament has been repeated in a second tournament Axelrod hosted, and a third called the ecological tournament. Tit-for-tat won in all three tournaments, even though those who participated knew how the first tournament had unfolded. This isn’t because it’s the best strategy, but it’s the one that best accounts for the behaviour of other players in a forgiving, fair way. Other elements of tit-for-tat that see it benefit are never being the first to defect, retaliating against defectors quickly, and clarity in defections.
This isn’t happening today.
The downside is that bad actors emerge and create an escalating environment. We need backstops in the current Israel-Iran conflict, and in the Middle East generally, and de-escalatory moves need to be made. In the long-term, cooperation needs to be incentivised and then returned with further cooperation. Many would have said this seemed impossible between Saudi Arabia and Iran, yet here we sit today.
There are multiple examples throughout history of cooperation when it seems escalation will never end. There are always things that both sides can agree on. Eventual cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis saw the US remove missiles from Turkey and the Soviets pull out of Cuba. Communication and transparency were then promoted via the direct line between the two countries. They were still rivals, but de-escalatory mechanisms were implemented as backstops.
However, during periods of geopolitical change, we’re bound to experience more friction between players. As the world order shifts to one of a multipolar nature, tension will emerge and power will shift. We have to be careful to not cast aside relations during this time, even with rivals. During geopolitical competition, there is space for small cooperation and mutual gains. There is space for de-escalation.
In the Middle East, as I’ve discussed in depth above, this is easier said than done. I’ve previously discussed in my Israel-Palestine series that the approach to peace should be a long-term plan revolving around education, as proposed by
.
I still support this case. The lessons from Axelrod’s game should be upheld with the aim of de-escalation based on the concepts of forgiveness, not being the first to defect and swift, clear responses.
This is not what we’re witnessing today. This requires the effort of all players, and perhaps even an international strategy, such as global de-escalatory mechanisms when tensions reach a certain level. The Geopolitical Risk Index could be utilised. We have more options than war. It seems some actors don’t currently see that, but they must be convinced.
I could be interpreted as naive, or unrealistic. But I know elements of my optimistic view are possible. We only need incentives, which are also possible, as history has proven. If the nations involved don’t want de-escalation, and escalation is inevitable, then there is no hope. I, for one, hope this isn’t the case, but I’m aware the signs are all there.
Concluding Remarks
Thousands have fled Lebanon into Syria, another country which is embroiled in a war. The Middle East is tense, and the current trend is greater escalation. Israel is a key player involved in this, and with Netanyahu and the far-right government remaining in power, conflict will continue. In my first series on Israel and Palestine, I stated this would not be a quick conflict for the Middle East. I’ll reinforce this now. Israel states it will launch a “limited” ground operation into Lebanon, but we know Israel wants to feel secure. A buffer zone enforced by Israel could limit further direct ground conflict from Hezbollah, but aerial assaults would still ensure citizens can’t return to Northern Israel. Hezbollah and the Houthis can hit Israel from afar. Hence I question the prose of a “limited” operation. If the pursuit is security for Israel, then via the method of a buffer zone, it’s a goal that can’t be achieved.
Previously, when Israel invaded Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, they were repelled by UN forces. Now they won’t allow the UN Secretary-General to enter Israel, so good luck having the UN enforce anything and having Israel listen.
The question becomes now, how does Israel respond? They have stated they will respond when they see fit and to the level they deem suitable. Biden has stated attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities will not be supported but has indicated attacks on Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure could be a possibility. We’ve seen Iranian supertankers empty in the last week in the scenario that this occurs.
If we look forward towards some imaginary end to all fighting in the Middle East, does it require a more powerful state to step in and pressure the actors involved in the conflict? Does this need to see the U.S. stance towards Israeli support change or Chinese involvement to pull Iran back? Otherwise, are we set for another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict?
Remember, Netanyahu needs a war. If he remains in power for many more years, one of the biggest geopolitical questions that could define this entire decade would be where does Netanyahu look next to maintain personal power through war?
As for the Iran missile attack, both sides want to emerge as the victor. Israel stated the attack was “a failure”, but it was less of a failure than April, with many missiles getting through Israel’s defences.
It has also been debated whether Iran aimed to cause little damage in its attack by aiming for military assets and not civilians in an attempt to de-escalate Alrernatively, Iran could be seen as sending a message by aiming at Israel’s military facilities that they could hit them harder if they wanted to. Iran did comment after the attack that it didn’t demonstrate its full capabilities with this recent attack. The rhetoric in the Middle East is clearly escalatory. With no geopolitical actor in the region being pressured enough internationally, there is potential for this to escalate further. If this escalation is to cede, something has to change to disrupt the current direction of travel. Otherwise, we’re travelling down the road with no brakes.
Other News In Geopolitics This Week
Biden Won't Back Israeli Strikes On Iran's Nuclear Facilities
Chevron Sells Oil Sands And Shale Assets In Canada To Canadian Natural Resources For $6.5B
National Iranian Tanker Company Empty Supertankers, Fearing Attack
UK and Mauritius Call To Exercise Sovereignty of Chagos Archipelago
US Port Workers Agree To End Strike With 62% Wage Increase Accepted
West Seeking To Finalize Using Russian FX Funds To Pay For Ukraine War
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Israeli_legislative_election
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_Israel#:~:text=The%20far%2Dright%20in%20Israel,in%20the%20Knesset%2C%20Israel's%20parliament.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trial_of_Benjamin_Netanyahu#:~:text=Netanyahu's%20trial%20in%20the%20Jerusalem,the%20trial%20is%20still%20ongoing.
https://gulfif.org/irans-strategic-patience-unpacking-hezbollah-policy-in-the-gaza-war/
https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-lebanon-war-hezbollah-10-1-24-intl-hnk/index.html
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/oct/01/israel-lebanon-attacks-live-blog-ground-offensive-hezbollah-hamas-gaza-war
https://news.sky.com/story/amp/iran-attack-on-israel-if-this-is-the-best-iran-can-do-then-israel-will-chalk-this-up-as-another-victory-analysis-13226067
https://x.com/sentdefender
https://amp.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/oct/01/israel-lebanon-attacks-live-blog-ground-offensive-hezbollah-hamas-gaza-war
https://news.sky.com/story/amp/iran-attack-regime-may-have-felt-it-needed-to-flex-its-muscles-to-try-to-stem-israels-expanding-actions-13226293
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-israels-jewishness-is-overtaking-its-democracy/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-state_solution#/media/File:Occupied_Palestinian_Territories.jpg
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/05/israel-mossad-hezbollah-pagers-nasrallah/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/02/iranian-strikes-on-israel-what-happened-why-did-iran-attack-missiles-damage-what-next
https://faculty.sites.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/archive/econ308/tesfatsion/axeltmts.pdf
https://axelrod.readthedocs.io/en/fix-documentation/reference/play_contexts.html
https://www.reddit.com/r/math/comments/1bdrwl3/current_most_optimal_strategy_for_axelrods/
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/game-theory/axelrod.html
Excellent piece, and thanks for the shout out!