Geopolitics Review - 5th August 2024
Ukraine Updates
Contents
Introduction
Frontlines and Key Fighting Zones
Key Events
Changes In Strategy
Potential For Ukraine Sovereign Default
The Three Elections
Potential Negotiators
Concluding Remarks
Bitesize Edition
It’s been a long time since I’ve covered what is happening in Ukraine. For those hoping for coverage of Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran, and further escalations in the Middle East, keep an eye out for my coverage of that later in the week.
As for Ukraine, we’ve reached the stage of attrition. Progress is slow for either side, but the war is still Russia’s to lose. They have more troops and are slowly advancing in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine.
In the South, the Dneiper River and the destruction of the Kakhovka dam last June have seen an already marshland area become even more unnavigable. Down here, it’s likely the lines sat on either side of the Dneiper will remain.
And so, with Luhansk held entirely by Russia, we look to Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia. Pokrovsk is where a large amount of media coverage is currently based on, after previous long drawn-out battles in Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Yesterday, Ukraine received its first F-16s, in what will change the field of war when they do get in the air. This won’t be yet, however. So, where are we now in Ukraine, and where are we heading? Let’s explore below.
Introduction
The Russia-Ukraine War has entered the stage of attrition. A few weeks ago, I first heard the opinion that this conflict could be a case of whose society collapses first. I think it’s a scenario that has to be considered. For now, let’s explore where the key fighting is occurring today.
Frontlines and Key Fighting Zones
In exploring the Ukraine war, before diving into the key events, I think it’s prudent to explore where the frontlines and key fighting zones are, and how this has changed over the previous months.
Back in March 2022, we found ourselves in this situation seen in the top right:
It’s clear from the graphic above from March 2022 that Russia wanted, and likely expected with their initial march on Kyiv, to take Ukraine quickly. This is especially supported by the Ukrainian counter-offensive that had to retake an area of Ukraine that Russia doesn’t claim any longer in its claim of the four regions. Putin lowered his expectations out of necessity, and they now claim four territories, those being Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
Ukraine has been preparing since 2014 when we saw the annexation of Crimea for a potential conflict with Russia. Any military analysis the Russians completed before their invasion that predicted an easy win wholeheartedly underestimated this preparation and the heart of the Ukrainians.
Between July and November 2022, Ukraine quickly regained territory around Kherson and Kharkiv. Since then, the war has been slow-moving. Logistical issues have hampered the Russians, while aid into Ukraine has seen the conflict continue to escalate, from anti-tank weapons to tanks to F16s for the Ukrainians. The conflict is also no longer limited to just Ukraine, with long-range missiles striking within Russia, specifically aiming at key logistical infrastructure such as airfields and oil refineries.
One of the key geographical elements of the conflict is the Dneiper River. Back in June 2023, we saw the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. At the time, it had been Russia-controlled and the disputed thesis is the Russians blew up the dam to slow a Ukrainian counteroffensive. This certainly worked, flooding large areas downriver from the dam explosion. The other side of the Dneiper is marshland, which is very difficult for any forces to navigate even when it hasn’t been flooded. As a result, a stalemate appears to have formed in the South along the Dnieper. Other impacts from the dam explosion include water supply in the long term to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and Crimea itself, both of which were supplied by the reservoir held by the Kakhovka Dam. Sergei Aksyonov, Russia’s supported head of Crimea, stated they had two years of water in storage back when the dam was destroyed. If we reach the summer of 2025 and the war is still ongoing, this could become an issue that rises to the surface once again.
Russia in theory can get supplies to Crimea over the Kerch Strait Bridge, which Ukraine has targeted many times, or through the annexed territories in Ukraine by truck. They can also use vessels that have been frequently travelling back and forth between Rostov-on-Don and the Sea of Azov. None of these methods are particularly efficient and are vulnerable to Ukrainian attacks.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive that commenced in June 2023, and ended in December has been described as an “operational failure”, even if it did see the Ukrainians recapture 14 villages in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. Initially, they wanted to launch a counteroffensive in the spring, but poor weather delayed it until the summer. The Russians were more prepared than the 2022 counteroffensive, digging trenches, placing landmines, and establishing artillery positions. This counteroffensive was described by many as the start of this period of stalemate within the war.
After this, it was noted that a new strategy would be needed by Ukraine and its supporters in the West. This was seemingly confirmed when it was announced F16s would be sent to Ukraine, back in August 2023. Yesterday we saw Zelenskyy announce they have received the first F-16s. It will provide Ukraine with a level of air-ability to challenge the Russians more than they currently possess with old Soviet technology. It could also provide Ukraine with stronger capabilities to defend against Russian glide bombs or to hit infrastructure within Russia more easily. However, since the announcement back in August, Russia has increased its attacks on Ukrainian airbases where F-16s would be held. So much so, that it has been discussed if the aircraft would be held in Ukraine at all. Russia was essentially stating that if F-16s are received, we know where they’ll be, and we’ll have the capabilities to hit them. With Ukraine receiving the first F-16s today, but not having enough trained pilots to fly them, there is still set to be a period of time before their impact on the war is seen. Ukraine has stated that 20 F-16s will be in the air by the end of 2024. How this affects the war remains to be seen, but it won’t be yet. What Ukraine has struggled to do throughout the entire war is to find air superiority. This gives them to opportunity to do so and to better defend the territory it has. If the aim is to give Ukraine a greater platform to stand on at eventual negotiations, it’s a good place to start. Unless we find ourselves continuing to escalate.
The biggest areas of conflict continue to occur in the Donetsk region. Russia controls all of the Luhansk region, and in the South, as stated earlier, the Dneiper has formed a stalemate stronger than other areas along the frontlines.
The battles within the Russia-Ukraine conflict have seen huge media coverage for areas such as Bakhmut, and then Avdiivka. Russia seized Bakhmut in May 2023, and Avdiivka in February 2024. The Russians are now looking towards the city of Pokrovsk, which has been touted as a key supply route for Ukraine. Specifically, the Russians have currently targeted two villages to Pokrovsk’s east called Zhelanne and Novooleksandrivka. This part of the conflict continues to see small areas heavily focused on in this conflict, with the stakes of these battles overinflated in the grand scheme of the full conflict. The battles are slow, and the overall gain for the eventual winner is very little. These battles provide a temporary morale boost, in a war riddled with low morale. Momentum is important, but in this war, any gained momentum is crushed quickly by the beginning of the next slow-paced battle. One such battle for Pokrovsk is commencing now. It is pitting 40,000 Russian troops against six Ukrainian brigades with around 12,000 troops. As this conflict has been from the start, it’s Russia who continues to throw people at its war effort, and it’s unfortunately theirs to lose. As well as glide bombs, the Russians are using a large amount of anti-tank missiles to slow Ukrainian heavy vehicles. The rural areas to the East of Pokrovsk are seeing Russia advance quicker than can occur in urban areas. The closer to Pokrovsk the fighting gets, the slower advance we will see. I’d once again expect another long, drawn-out conflict for Pokrovsk, occurring over many months.
Now, I'm going to reflect on some of the key events that have occurred over the previous few months in the war between Russia and Ukraine.
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