Contents
Introduction
The Border Crisis Continues
A Lack of Support For Armenia
The Turning Tides
Armenia’s Future and Azerbaijan’s Hopes
Concluding Remarks
Bitesize Edition
Although it appears that the battle between Azerbaijan and Armenia for control of Nagorno-Karabakh is over, the war could only just be beginning. In 2022, we saw Azerbaijan conduct attacks directly over the border into Armenian territory.
There also exists the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan, which is separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. One aspect of the 2020 ceasefire was that Armenia would guarantee the security of transport links between the enclave and the mainland. Despite this, it's clear that Azerbaijan wants stronger connections to the enclave, so it possesses a land link with its strong ally, Turkey.
This is occurring at the same time as Armenia is looking rather weak. They relied too heavily on Russian support, which was there until it wasn’t. The Armenians are now scrambling for new support.
What has occurred thus far in this ongoing border crisis, where is Armenia looking for support, and what are the potential future directions for this? Azerbaijan has referred to Armenia as Western Azerbaijan in the past. Is this its long-term goal?
Introduction
We’ve previously discussed the deep history that contributed to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s large offensive against the Armenian-aligned breakaway state of Artsakh led to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh coming back under Azerbaijani control. The Artsakh Defence Army was disarmed, and surrender occurred one day after the offensive began.
It appears that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is over.
However, in 2022, we saw Azerbaijan conduct attacks directly over the border into Armenian territory. Although the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh is over, this was just one battle.
Is the war just getting started?
Let’s break down the key events in this border crisis, why Armenia isn’t being supported, and who could potentially step into a supporting role in the future. Finally, we’ll explore the future directions this conflict could head in.
The Border Crisis Continues
One of the key elements of this conflict is the Azeri region of Nakhchivan, which is an enclave of Azerbaijan. Importantly, the territory is separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenia.
The separation arose during the period of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. After the dissolution in May 1918, tensions and contests emerged between the First Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, Syunik, Qazax, and Nakhchivan. After Ottoman control ended after World War One, the British placed Nakhchivan under the Armenian umbrella in April 1919, leading to an Azerbaijani revolt.
July 1920 saw the Bolshevik Russians as the key influence over the region. Both the Bolsheviks and Azeris promised that Nakhchivan, Nagorno Karabakh, and Zangezur were part of Armenia. After a March 1921 referendum, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic became an autonomous republic within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Today, the region is a majority Azeri population, with a small population of Russians.
This separation between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan has contributed to Azeri wishes for a more direct connection to the enclave. The ceasefire after the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War saw Armenia agree to ensure the security of transport connections between the enclave and mainland Azerbaijan, as overseen by Russian Border Services. The connection would be named the Zanzegur Corridor and has been promoted by both Azerbaijan and Turkey since the conclusion of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Here are the other regions experiencing crises on the border between the two states:
· Syunik-Lachin Border
· Vayots Dzor-Kalbajar Border
· Gegharkunik-Kalbajar Border
· Gegharkunik-Dashkasan Border
However, Azerbaijan is in the driver’s seat in this conflict, regaining the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh after it lost it to the Armenians 30 years earlier in 1994. Do they want to continue using their power to build a more secure land bridge to Nakhchivan? This would isolate Armenia from Iran which has historically demonstrated support for the Armenians. However, outside of Iranian support, it currently appears that Armenia is struggling for support, and even the support from the Iranians is on occasion questionable. They relied heavily on Moscow, and this backfired. Why did it backfire? And if anybody would support Armenia, who would potential candidates be?
A Lack of Armenian Support – Why Nations Aren’t Incentivized
The apparent lack of support for Armenia is two-fold. It’s a lack of incentives to support Armenia, and an array of economic and energy incentives to not go too heavily against Azerbaijan.
Coupled with the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh was recognised internationally as Azeri territory, and it’s been a lot of words against the aggression, backed up with little action from the key regional powers in Europe and Asia.
Azerbaijan is a key player in oil and natural gas markets both onshore and offshore. Azerbaijan has stated it will double exports of gas to the EU by 2027, with the EU seeking to diversify its natural gas imports after the energy decoupling from Russia and the Nord Stream sabotage. In the first 10 months of 2023, more than half of gas exports out of Azerbaijan were via pipeline. The Azeris and Turks also started construction on a pipeline connecting Turkey to Nakhchivan which will enable Azerbaijan to deliver its own gas via Turkey and reduce reliance for the enclave on Iranian gas.
Goods also cross from Europe generally, heading across the Caspian Sea and into Asia, and of course back the same way.
One huge change was the role of the Russians. Of course, they are distracted in Ukraine, but they were supportive of Armenia until very recently. Their peacekeepers were in place to maintain the Lachin Corridor. So how are we now in the situation we find ourselves in, with the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh? And what of the CSTO Security Guarantee?
Well, the CSTO Security Guarantee wasn’t a guarantee. After Russia chose to pivot to the economic benefits of closer ties with the Azeris, it was the beginning of the end for Armenian control in Nagorno-Karabakh. No other nation outside of Belarus has also directly assisted Russia with its war in Ukraine. The CSTO was nothing more than Russia attempting to maintain close ties with former Soviet states. After the events of Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and now the Ukraine war starting in February 2022, would other former Soviet states not look and see the pattern?
It brings into question how reliable the security guarantees of these organisations are, especially with recent coverage of Trump discussing NATO members not contributing enough payment in defence.
The Armenians have made clear they are seeking alternative relations. In October, they joined the International Criminal Court, most notable for having their arrest warrant out for Vladimir Putin.
With Nagorno-Karabakh recognised as Azeri territory internationally, a security guarantee wasn’t triggered via the CSTO since Azerbaijan was in essence taking back territory deemed to be theirs internationally. Whether a region in which another state contains the ethnic majority should or shouldn’t be deemed the territory of the ethnic minority is a question for another day.
The current issue arose during the current border crisis. Azerbaijan attacked Armenian-recognised territory in 2022, and the CSTO and Russia remained silent.
Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan stated that it was a mistake to rely only on Moscow. Now Armenia is scrambling for alternatives that aren’t immediately clear.
Any nation that would want to decrease or hedge against Russian influence in the Caucasus could be a candidate for an Armenian partnership or those who wish to collect their slice of the pie for trade heading through the region.
The Turning Tides
Considering the long-term trajectory of this conflict: How did we go from an Armenian victory in 1994 to a complete reversal three decades later? Some potential reasons.
A huge aspect of this shift on a short-term basis was Armenian reliance on Russian support. When Russian support included a focus on cultivating stronger relations with the Azeris, it was natural the Armenians would find themselves in a weaker position. In short, the Armenians banked on Russian support always being there, until it wasn’t.
Add in Turkey’s military support for the Azeris, as well as Israeli support to counter the Iranians, and the Azeris possessing 20,000 more combat troops than the Armenians, and the tides of the conflict over three decades have well and truly shifted.
Armenia’s Future And Azerbaijan’s Hopes
These last few years have seen high levels of tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The border crisis continues, but certain events will ensure attention is directed elsewhere in 2024. Azerbaijan is set to host COP29 and won’t want to be embroiled in any geopolitical struggles that could put the success of this event in jeopardy. We saw at COP28 through leaked documents that the UAE supposedly wanted to use the summit to make oil deals in the background. What came out of the summit was a proposed tripling of nuclear energy by 2050. Azerbaijan could hope for similar “wins” in their COP summit, whether seen as contributing to the clean energy transition or not.
When viewed over a period of decades, the Azeris continue to inciter aggressive rhetoric against the Armenians, and Armenian weakness is clear to see. It’s isolated. The Russians flipped from supporting Armenia to now not stopping Azerbaijan from taking what it wants. If the Azeris manage to block Armenian access to Iran through a land bridge to Nakhchivan, the Armenians will be restricted from one of the few allies they have left. Even then, the relationship with Iran is a complicated one, especially currently as Iran is seeking improved relations with the Azeris in certain aspects.
Part of the 2020 ceasefire agreement, as stated, was the Armenians allowing the Azeris to transport to and from Nakhchivan. If the Russian Peacekeepers didn’t prevent the Azeri moves on the Lachin Corridor in 2023, which they were supposed to maintain for peaceful transport between mainland Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh when it was under Armenian control, why would the Armenians trust the Russians to do the same thing again?
The Iranian Foreign Minister in 2022 stated that the Iran-Armenia border must remain unchanged, but with Iran’s discreet support of Armenia, would they do anything about it if a Turkish and Russian-backed Azerbaijan made a move? Unlikely. Iran has enough on its plate in the Middle East without getting more heavily involved in the Caucasus.
Up to now, the Azeris have been fighting for territory that was de-jure recognised as theirs and hence received little international backlash for the move, other than calls for peaceful solutions and an end to the conflict. States spoke but didn’t do anything about it.
If the Azeris move ahead at some point in the future to turn Armenia into “Western Azerbaijan”, there will be greater uproar in the international community. But this border crisis has been occurring since 2022, and the lack of support for the Armenians doesn’t bode well. There is interest in support from the Indians who have sent weapons and air defence and the French, but there’s a difference between states who will stand by and watch and those who will support with weapons and funding. The United States also held joint military drills with the Armenians last year, as these nations seek more influence in the Caucasus to rival Russia and other alliances in surrounding areas. For example, the Indians could wish to counter the strong Azerbaijan-Pakistan partnership.
In short, the Armenians need more friends, and fast.
Concluding Remarks
After the events of 2023, relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia did show some small signs of warming.
Azerbaijan is the stronger of the two powers and is positioned to be a pathway between Europe and China. Geopolitically, this places them in a role that could see their influence increase, and of course, an economic boost to come with it. Being embroiled in a war would limit this potential.
There have been whisperings of a peace deal in recent months. Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan told the EU last October that he would be willing to sign a treaty with the Azeris. A deal was signed on November 9th that ended all hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Perhaps December 2023’s events of a prisoner swap, an intention to normalise ties, and Armenia’s backing of Azerbaijan’s COP29 candidacy would improve relations.
The December discussions certainly didn’t end the general border crisis. Four soldiers were killed by Azerbaijani fire as recently as February 13th, 2024, in Nerkin Hand in Syunik Province.
We sometimes see economic benefits prioritised over geopolitical issues such as border and territorial tensions. Could this be one such example where peace and economic prosperity are eventually prioritised? It boils down to negotiation and diplomacy, and how far Azerbaijan wants to push to get what it wants. In 2019, Aliyev discussed that the world was changing, and sometimes force is necessary. Does this imply if Aliyev doesn’t get what he wants diplomatically, he’ll use force? He certainly did with Nagorno-Karabakh. The question now expands to the border crisis between the two states, which especially includes the links between Nakhichvan and Azerbaijan’s mainland, of which time will tell.
This concludes my work on the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. If you have any questions or gaps you feel haven’t been addressed, please leave a comment below. Next week, I’ll start discussions on another less-covered conflict: The conflict between Serbia and Kosovo.
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Sources
https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-india-weapons-anti-drone/32679654.html
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Azerbaijani_offensive_in_Nagorno-Karabakh#
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nakhchivan_Autonomous_Republic
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https://eurasianet.org/plans-for-doubling-azerbaijans-gas-flows-to-europe-on-hold